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r he IPTS Report is produced oti a monthly basis - ten issues a year to be precise, since there are no issues in January and August - by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
(IPTS) of the Joint Research Centre QRC) of the European Commission. The IFfS formally 
collaborates in the production of the IPTS Report with a group of prestigious European institutions, 
forming with IPTS the European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO). It also benefits from 
contributions from other colleagues in theJRC. 
The Report is produced simultaneously in four languages (English, French, German and 
Spanish) by the IPTS. 'lhe fact that it is not only available in several languages, but also largely 
prepared and produced on the Internet's World Wide Web, makes it quite an uncommon 
undertaking. 
The Report publishes articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rough balance between them, 
and exploiting intei-disciplinarity asfar as possible. Articles are deemed prospectively relevant if 
they attempt to explore issues not yet on the policymaker's agenda (but projected to be there sooner 
or later), or underappreciated aspects of issues already on the policymaker's agenda. The multi-
stage drafting and redrafting process, based on a series of interactive consultations with outside 
experts guarantees qualify control. 
The first, and possibly most significant indicator, of success is that the Report is being read. Tfx 
issue 00 (December 1995) had a print run of 2000 copies, in what seemed an optimistic 
projection at the time. Since then, readership of the papei- and electronic versions has far exceeded 
the 10,000 mark. Feedback, requests for subscriptions, as well as contributions, bave come from 
policymaking (but also academic and private sector) circles not only from various parts of 
Europe bid also from the US, japan, Australia, Latin America, N. Africa, etc. 
We shall continue to endeavour to find the best way of fulfilling the expectations of our quite 
diverse readership, avoiding oversimplification, as well as encyclopaedic reviews and the 
inaccessibility of academic journals. Ttoe key is to remind ourselves, as well as the readers, that 
we cannot be all things to all people, that it is important to carve our niche a?id continue 
optimally exploring and exploiting it, hoping to illuminate topics under a new, revealing light for 
the benefit of the readers, in order to prepare them for managing the challenges ahead. 
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The Seattle World Trade Organization 
(WTO) impasse 
D i m i t r i s K y r i a k o u , IPTS 
T he abortive Seattle WTO meetings signalled a failure of a kind unseen in previous trade negotiations. In past rounds impasses reached usually 
involved technical/legal issues, which 
specialists could (and did) revisit, in order 
to sculpt a carefully worded, consensus-
seeking text. 
Such impasses did not question the 
fundamental continuity of the process. In 
Seattle however, there were serious poli-
tical divisions, with the less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) appearing uncharacteristi-
cally united. 
There was denunciation of the proce-
dures, and not just the texts. There was little 
scientific and technical (S/T) preparation, both 
overall as well as on specific issues, 
(e.g. foodstuffs), to help clarify the terms 
of the debate, the stakes, the repercussions 
of alterna-tives considered. Science and 
governance did not meet to allow policy 
choices to ground their legitimacy on an 
S/T-informed process, to be more than 
the arbitrary selection resulting from 
power struggles, untamed by facts and 
cool-headed analysis. Reduced legitimacy 
facilitated attacks on the organization itself, 
and even public outcry on the streets 
by groups which descended on the city, 
stinging the WTO like a swarm of bees. 
The impasse was far from an unexpected 
turn of events. Unlike previous trade rounds 
the preparatory work for this one found 
little common ground. People close to the 
process warned that the complexity of the 
agenda boded ill for its outcome. The failure 
of the multilateral negotiations on investment 
in 1998 was a portentous omen. The Croup77 
of 130 LDCs had stated back in September 
1999 that they would not acquiesce to 
new liberalization drives, before the imple-
mentation issues still pending from the Uruguay 
round (UR) were addressed - what they dubbed 
the need to review, repair and reform the WTO. 
This ran contrary to the desires of the large 
players. The LDCs saw themselves as having 
abided by the WTO dispute-settlement mecha-
nism, and its unprecedented power, during 
a very painful period for them, due to the 
Asian crisis and its aftermath. They were 
thus loath to accept what they perceived 
as a cavalier attitude on the part of both the US 
and the EU, vis-à-vis complying with WTO 
rules (cf. tax-shelters for export profits in the 
US, bananas an beef cases for the EU). The 
insistence of the US to include issues such as 
labour standards (the EU proposed more 
tactfully a joint WTO-International Labour 
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Organization (ILO) study) on the agenda, 
further cemented the LDC front. The public 
reference by the US President to using trade 
sanctions against those who flout labour 
standards confirmed LDC fears. 
The awkward way in which the US Trade 
Representative amassed the roles/titles of 
host, chairman, and leader of the US dele-
gation did not help either. The coup de 
grace was given by the continued use of 
the 'green-room' process. This entailed bringing 
the large players in small meetings to carve 
out deals/texts on specific issues, groups in 
which certain LDC delegates, chosen ad 
hoc, were invited while the rest were left 
wandering around the corridors. Besides infu-
riating LDC delegates such methods highlighted 
another cause of failure: inadequacy of 
procedures for a 135 member WTO. Given the 
power wielded by the WTO, all members 
understandably want to vet decisions 
/documents which may strongly impinge on 
their welfare/sovereignty. 
The fierce battle for the election of the 
WTO Director-General last September, not 
only left a sour taste among LDCs, it also 
allowed the new WTO management little 
time for preparation. Moreover, the compro-
mise reached in September included appointing 
the LDC favourite to run the WTO in 2002, 
perhaps making foot-dragging less costly 
for the LDCs. 
Beyond LDC reactions and procedural 
tensions, the EU-US differences played 
a key role, too. The US claims to favour 
elimination of agricultural subsidies; the 
EU favours gradual subsidy reduction, and 
the consideration of the environmental, cultural 
and social aspects of agriculture. The dispute 
on trade of genetically modified products 
reared its head again. US proposals for a 
WTO panel to study the issue were ultimately 
not accepted when EU environment ministers 
reacted tersely to anything that may antago-
nize the discussions on biosafety, under 
the auspices of the UN. On another bilateral 
front the Japanese objection to the use of 
anti-dumping measures arbitrarily and frivo-
lously, according to Japan, by the US, also 
exacer-bated tensions. 
US actions motivated by domestic con-
siderations were crucial to the outcome. 
The insistence on having an early 'Clinton' 
round involved political legacy considera-
tions. The comments/positions that alie-
nated LDCs and the reluctance to discuss 
sensitive issues such as textiles, catered to 
influential US interest groups, labour 
unions, environmentalists, farmers, in an 
election year. 
The role of organized political protest, 
of an intensity unseen in the US for a 
generation, the successful swarming of the 
WTO by non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and the technical/legal 
assistance they offered to often beleaguered 
LDC delegates should not be neglected. 
The successful use of technology for 
coordination, the emergence of im-
promptu coalitions among unlikely bedfellows 
such as environmentalists and labour unions, 
raised the political cost of pursuing the 
meeting. Protest was catching the attention 
of too many bystanders. When these 
bystanders, in a US election year moreover, 
start weighing the lofty righteous messages 
of the protestors against supporting an 
arcane international bureaucracy, and at 
the cost of ugly street violence, the WTO 
and the talks may not seem very attractive 
after all. 
3 
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This reduced attractiveness reveals a sovereignty, the values by which a society lives. 
deeper problem: past rounds were easier Past rounds (especially the previous one) 
because targets were numerical and hardly conveniently postponed thorny issues for future 
something against which to rally wide support. rounds. As we reach the hard core of resis-
L Reducing tariffs from 20 to 10% does not tance to making everything secondary 
touch on what a country stands for; labour to trade expansion, the cost of going 
standards, food safety, environmental treatment that extra liberalization mile rises very 
come much closer to the hard core of steeply. 
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Managing Uncertainty and Public Trust 
in Technology Policy 
Ol i ve r Tod t , University of Valencia 
issue: Changes in technology policy­making or regulation have so far had only limited 
success in bridging the different points of view between social actors. In fact, the social 
resistance and increasing public debate with respect to certain technologies has made 
their introduction into the market or their industrial application rather difficult. 
Relevance: Recent developments in strategies like the broadening of stakeholder access 
to decision­making or precautionary regulation have shown some interesting, albeit 
ambiguous results. Further analysis of these policy approaches is needed since they 
could have the potential to overcome one of the most fundamental problems of current 
technology debates, i.e. the lack of trust among social actors. Moreover, EU technology 
institutions could play a key role in building trust­enhancing networks. 
introduction: Technology and Society 
T echnology is a social activity, as research in the area of the social studies of science and technology (STS) has pointed out. Any technical system can be described more 
accurately as a socio­technical system, not only 
because technology design and development is 
based on human decisions, but also because 
human actors form an integral part of any technical 
system and its operation. This point of view, which 
interprets technology as social practice, integrated 
with other societal activity and subject to (mutual) 
influence, has important consequences for the 
approach to technology management. In fact, in 
response, the policy process has been starting to 
change in the last two decades. 
Fundamental to the social conflicts in relation to 
modern technology is the debate concerning the 
uncertainty of its possible future effects. Many 
traditional approaches to technology policy base 
decision­making on specialized expertise alone and 
tend to interpret uncertainty as manageable through 
expert knowledge. However, these policy 
approaches have come into conflict with the views 
and values of other social groups in recent decades. 
An important by­product of this conflict has been a 
certain erosion of public trust in the policy­making 
process, as demonstrated by a number of recent 
cases at both the European and international levels. 
The Social Debate: Uncertainty and Trust 
A crucial element of most technology­related 
conflicts has been the question of up to what point 
the possible effects (environmental, health, social, 
etc.) of a new technology can be reliably predicted. 
Two concepts (Wynne 1992) can be distinguished 
here: uncertainty, the lack of knowledge about the 
% 
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Traditional approaches 
to technology policy 
based on specialized 
expertisé lend to 
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view held by other 
social groups 
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Public trust has become 
one of the key issues 
facing modern 
technology. Tiie conflict 
over uncertainty has 
been one of the sources 
of erosion of that trust 
Public trust in ceitain 
technologies may be 
influenced more by 
confidence in the 
decision-making 
process than in the 
technologies themselves 
future behaviour of new technical systems (for 
instance, of the failure rates of components); and 
indeterminacy, the impossibility of predicting the 
behaviour of socio-technical systems because of the 
impossibility of predicting human behaviour (of all 
the human actors who form part of any such 
system). In a number of technology-related debates, 
the questions of uncertainty and indeterminacy 
have played an important role, for instance 
regarding failure probabilities of complex systems 
such as nuclear power plants, or regarding the 
behaviour of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in the environment. Some social actors, 
critical of certain technological applications, have 
built their case around the argument that 
uncertainty and indeterminacy make it necessary to 
proceed with precaution when authorizing and 
commercializing these technologies. They have 
criticized policy and regulation for not sufficiently 
reflecting these future uncertainties in decision-
making. And they have demanded more transparent 
procedures for risk assessment. 
Public trust in technology, and in the related 
decision making processes, has turned out to be 
one of the key issues facing modern technology. 
Not only has the development of various 
technologies been influenced in recent decades by 
the level of trust they commanded in civil society 
and in the wider public; the question of trust has 
become an decisive issue, for instance, in the 
Europe-wide conflicts concerning genetic 
engineering or food safety. Among others, the 
issues of the insufficiency of common European 
regulation, institutions and policy responses as 
well as questions concerning public openness of 
the decision processes were factors which led to a 
degradation of public trust. 
One of the sources of the erosion of public trust 
in certain technologies and their regulation, a 
process which has been going on for several 
decades now, is the conflict over uncertainty. And 
even more important here has been the conflict 
about the involvement of the different social actors 
in decision-making. Recent research suggests that 
the erosion of trust cannot be explained by simple 
public ignorance about the scientific and technical 
questions at hand. Rather, gains or losses of trust are 
the result of very complex social processes, in 
which the perceived level of control over the 
decisions is one important factor (e.g. Grove-White 
ef a/. 1997). This becomes especially important in 
the light of the evidence that the level of confidence 
in the technology itself may actually not be the most 
important issue, but rather the level of confidence in 
the decision-making processes (for policy, 
regulation, etc.). In some cases it can be inferred 
from the data that the lack of trust in the process is 
negatively affecting the level of trust in the 
technology itself. 
Technology Management Responses 
An effective policy process must therefore 
respond to these two questions: it must manage 
uncertainty while building trust among all 
stakeholders in the technology itself, as well as in 
the related decision-making processes. Current 
policy-making is not always effective in this regard. 
The debate about genetically modified (GM) 
products, for instance, shows that the social 
acceptance of this technology is intimately related 
to the question of trust in the policy processes and 
regulatory institutions at both European and 
national levels (EC, 1997; Grove-White et al. 1997). 
Several strategies have been developed to 
try to integrate the management of uncertainty and 
trust in technology policy. Among these (like 
organized social debate, continuous social 
technology assessment or user-oriented technology 
design), the most important ones from a public 
policy point of view at the EU level are 
precautionary (ex-ante) regulation and participatory 
decision-making in policy and foresight. 
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The theoretical justification of these two 
strategies responds clearly to the problems of 
uncertainty and trust raised above. According to 
the precautionary regulation concept, in order to 
manage the uncertainties and indeterminacy with 
regard to the future behaviour of socio­technical 
systems, regulation should proceed based on the 
precautionary principle. That is, in the case of 
serious doubts, certain actions should be 
subjected to especially rigorous controls, or 
should not be undertaken at all (O'Riordan and 
Cameron 1994). Public participation, on the other 
hand, derives one of its most important 
justifications from its potential for trust building 
among social actors by permitting them to have a 
voice in decisions. Both precaution and 
participation aim at channelling conflict over 
technology into productive dialogue among 
stakeholders. These approaches clearly do not 
pretend to eliminate this conflict, which has been 
described as one of the driving forces of 
innovation (see, for instance: Hård, 1993). 
Precaution and Participation in 
European Public Policy Practice 
In practice, both strategies have seen some 
(albeit limited) application in recent years in 
European (and international) policy. Participatory 
decision making has been applied to policy­
making and regulation for a number of years now, 
especially in environmental decision­making, on 
a local level, and in relation to specific technical 
projects (especially in infrastructure planning). 
Precautionary approaches have found some 
application in environmental regulation in the last 
decades, but their application to technology 
policy and regulation is more recent. 
The influence of both strategies on technology 
management and policy has remained ambiguous, 
even though they have shown some encouraging 
results in specific areas. The most relevant 
European (and international) case in recent years to 
analyse the implications of these strategies is the 
social debate which has developed in relation TO 
genetically modified foods. 
The centrepiece of the European regulatory 
basis of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
(Directive 90/220, see: EC, 1990) implicitly 
embodies precautionary and participatory 
elements. The Directive 90/220 prescribes a 
complex authorization procedure for GM 
products as well as for pre­marketing 
experiments, and went into effect well before any 
such product was ready for marketing. Thus, in 
many ways, the Directive incorporates 
precaution. It also opens up possibilities for direct 
participation of representatives of civil society in 
the regulatory bodies. Despite these provisions, 
this regulatory framework did not discourage the 
social conflict and social resistance from 
developing which during 1999 led to a de­facto 
moratorium on GM products in the EU. In this 
sense, neither the indirect precautionary 
provisions nor the possibilities for participation 
have had the desired overall effect of building 
public trust. However, the provision for 
participation has only been put into practice in 
very few member states, and even there only to a 
very limited degree. And while the Directive's 
approach is precautionary in regulating GM 
technology comprehensively, and already during 
the development phase, it does not explicitly 
define precaution nor state its specific application 
in regulatory practice. It is therefore unclear if a 
more explicit precautionary formulation of the 
regulation and more widespread direct 
participation in regulation could have built more 
confidence among stakeholders, minimizing the 
social conflict. 
However, on a smaller scale, the implicit 
participation­precaution approach of the 
Directive has helped to bring about changes in 
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in GMO regulation have 
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If conflicts are to be 
avoided, global markets 
need common 
regulato)!/ frameworks. 
Moves in this direction 
mm in parallel with the 
emergence of a global 
civil society focussing 
on the social and 
environmental effects of 
modem technology 
the regulatory process which can be interpreted 
as a first step towards trust building through 
social learning. Despite the limited putting into 
practice of public participation (and information), 
this still helped to create direct contacts and 
some constructive interchange between 
regulators, policy-makers and civil society, in 
some cases even before the beginning of the 
marketing of the technology's products. 
Regulators and policy-makers have developed 
more understanding for public concerns, which 
is reflected in their decision-making (Todt, O. and 
Lujan, J.L., 2000). Furthermore, GM regulation 
and policy have been relatively dynamic, able to 
adapt to the changing social demands and 
technical background. In at least one case the 
regulation has even changed some of its basic 
philosophy by enhancing its precautionary 
approach in response to the social debate. The 
case in point is the transformation of a debate on 
the possible long-term effects of the cultivation of 
GM maize into a policy decision to introduce 
post-marketing monitoring for this crop in the 
field. This decision allayed some stakeholder 
concerns about future uncertainties, while at the 
same time permitting the marketing authorization 
for the crop. 
Overall, the precautionary and participatory 
elements in GMO regulation have not hindered 
the development of this technology. All 
applications (with very few exceptions) for GMO 
field trials and marketing of products have been 
granted in all member states to date (with the 
important exception, of course, of the current de-
facto moratorium agreed to by a majority of 
member states). But, on the other hand, these 
precautionary-participatory elements have led to 
a certain degree of social learning, increased 
sensitivity and responsiveness of the policy-
makers and regulators to public concerns, and 
more intensive formal contacts between the 
different social actors. 
Trans-European and International 
Dimensions 
A common EU technology policy which 
includes precaution and participation could go a 
long way towards minimizing intra-European 
conflicts, like the ones on food safety mentioned 
above, and strengthen the single market. But it 
could also be a decisive policy in international 
trade policy. Global markets need common 
regulatory frameworks. If not, trade conflicts are 
likely to erupt, like the ones between the U.S. and 
the EU on GMOs or hormone-treated beef. They 
are born out of, among other things, different 
approaches to precaution or policy regarding 
cultural factors and civil society. A good example 
is the international effort to agree on an 
international biosafety protocol, which would 
regulate GMO trade. Failure to reach agreement 
has aggravated the conflict on genetic engineering 
which is leading to a backlash against 
biotechnology agriculture with high costs for 
industry. On the other hand, a global civil society 
is emerging which is focused on the social and 
environmental effects of modern technology in 
global markets. Common policy and regulatory 
responses, which take full account of this 
situation, could minimize conflicts. 
Implications for European Policy-
making 
The experience from the first applications of 
policy strategies focused on participation and 
precaution suggests, despite some ambiguous 
results, that they might have a real potential for 
minimizing the lack of public trust in the policy 
process while responding to the challenges posed 
by the social debate about the future uncertainties 
of technology. 
The underlying philosophy of such a policy 
approach would be attaining long term social 
backing for new technologies through trust-
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building by way of social sensibility, precaution, 
etc., even at the costs of a higher complexity of 
the process of technology development and 
management. Civil society would in practice 
serve as a constant informational link between 
policy and wider society (equal to other social 
actors like industry representatives, trade unions, 
etc.). In practice, policy­makers and NGOs would 
enter into a permanent formal dialogue through 
advisory bodies (which include all relevant social 
actors) in all fields related to technology 
management, regulation, policy, and forecasting. 
The ultimate decision­making authority would of 
course have to remain in the hands of bodies with 
democratic legitimacy, even though a more direct 
participation of stakeholders in the preparation of 
decisions could be achieved. 
This policy would have to take account of a 
number of key points: 
• Especially important would be to ensure 
debate among all the involved social actors, 
not only about the technology itself but 
especially about the processes used to 
promote, manage and regulate this technology. 
A set­up of the regulatory procedures and 
institutions supported by all stakeholders from 
the outset is crucial to allow for a successful 
social integration of the technology, once it 
has entered the market. Trust of stakeholders in 
the outcomes (decisions, technology) needs 
trust in the process. This also points to the 
need that any such policy process would have 
to be continuous over the entire life cycle of 
the technology. 
• The process must remain open to constant 
revision. The legislation as well as any 
procedures must be inherently flexible to be 
able to respond not only to the social 
environment but also to new scientific 
evidence. This dynamic aspect is extremely 
important because not only the technology 
itself evolves. As pointed out by Grunwald 
(1999), the entire social framework is 
constantly changing. Only a constant feedback 
with civil society as well as wider society 
on R&D financing, regulation, market au­
thorization, etc. can maintain long­term social 
backing. Experiences like the ones with GMO 
and BSE demonstrate that otherwise the 
feedback might take the form of open conflict 
and resistance, entailing high costs to the 
development of the technology and its 
markets. 
• The feedback between technology develop­
ment, policy­making and society is especially 
important in the early phases of the R&D 
process. Many aspects of the technology and 
its effects, as well as the position of social 
actors, only become clear as the R&D process 
and the social debate proceed. It is crucial to 
minimize the risk of hardening of opposing 
positions of the different social actors, in 
parallel to the locking­in of conflictive 
technology options (which is what happened 
in the GMO case). For the same reasons, 
precaution has to go into effect concurrently 
with (or even better before) the corresponding 
technology is being applied. This could be 
achieved by starting social participation as 
well as the design of the regulatory framework 
early on in the process, e.g. already during the 
decision making on financing of R&D 
programmes. That way, the development of a 
technology could be accompanied from the 
start by a regulatory and social framework in 
order to build trust, while directing technology 
towards socially acceptable goals. 
• Related to this point is the need for technology 
forecasting and assessment to respond to the 
objectives and values of all sectors in society. 
This could be achieved through more social 
participation. One of the aims would be to 
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generate comprehensive proposals for regu-
latory frameworks for new technologies even 
before they enter the development and market 
phase (similar to the GMO Directives). 
• There also is the need for a more standardized, 
transparent and systematic risk assessment 
strategy with respect to new technology. A risk 
assessment which includes all aspects relevant 
to the social debate, and which gains EU-wide 
stakeholder support (to avoid conflicting 
assessment results in different member states). 
Again, a higher level of social participation 
would be one way of achieving this. 
• Also very Important is the unification of criteria 
on the European level. In this sense, the recent 
adoption by the European Commission of 
operational criteria for the precautionary 
principle (EC, 2000), for instance, is an 
important step forward. 
• Technology policy would need to be more 
sensitive to local and specific cultural issues 
which are Important for a technology's social 
integration. European-level institutions could 
play a central role and respond very 
specifically to the needs and concerns of 
European citizens. The creation of the Institute 
for Health and Consumer Protection (IHCP) of 
the Joint Research Centre ()RC) of the European 
Commission, for instance, is an important step 
in that direction. 
Overall, an important element in EU strategies 
seeking to build trust are precisely EU and 
technology institutions, such as the Joint Research 
Centre, which can play a central role in networks 
of institutions providing 'reference' quality 
information for such debates, eventually resolved 
at the policy level. Such networks animated by the 
JRC can help overcome the facile accusation of 
specific national or private interests and build a 
European system of reference information 
provision in a way that is open, credible, 
accountable and thorough. This will facilitate the 
debate between actors at the policy level and 
will provide a counterpart for interaction with 
non-EU agencies (as mentioned above, trade 
conflicts tend to erupt when regulatory 
frameworks diverge). 
integration of Technology Promotion 
and Regulation 
Moreover, one could explore integrating the 
processes for promoting and regulating technology, 
overcoming the current split of these two activities, 
which is a major source of social conflict. 
Technology policy would then be understood as 
decision making in a rather seamless web of 
forecasting, financing of R&D and promotion of 
certain technology trajectories, regulatory frame-
works, social integration, etc., which proceeds from 
the original research phase along the entire life 
cycle all the way to the dismantling phase. This 
could be achieved by stronger integrating different 
administrative responsibilities for the design of 
technology programmes (like the European 
Framework Programmes). The design of this 
integrated policy would not only include sections of 
the European administration responsible for 
consumers, health, or environment; it would also 
give civil society an important voice in the decision-
making. Administratively, this might, for instance, 
be accomplished by the creation of a separate 
administrative entity, charged with managing 
technology through its research, development and 
market phases. 
Such an integration of promotion and 
regulation of a new technology into one unified 
process would help to minimize the potential for 
conflict, while making possible a mutual social 
construction of technology, related policy, and 
acceptance through social learning. j«B 
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Foresight has acquired 
increasing importance 
in the formulation of 
science and technology 
policy. But to assess its 
results it may be helpful 
to look at the errors 
of the past 
Technology Foresights Need 
to Look Backwards 
Lars O l s s o n , NUTEK 
Issue: During the 1990s many countries, in Europe and elsewhere, have carried out 
technology foresight projects. Unlike earlier studies of the fu ture, which of ten 
concentrated on prediction, modern foresights usually strive to consider alternative 
visions of the future or just to create preparedness. However, the task of dealing with 
the future is a hazardous one. Historical research into failures of forecasting in the past 
may offer guidance on pitfalls. 
Relevance: When using the results of technology foresight projects for drawing up 
policy it is essential for the policy-makers to be able to assess the results. Here a 
historical perspective may be of great help in questioning ingrained lines of thought and 
broadening the outlook. Often the same errors tend to recur in forecasts f rom different 
times. Furthermore, i t is essential t o consider what different groups have been Involved 
in foresight work. 
Introduction 
W ith the many technology foresight projects carried out in the 1990s European policy-makers have gained improved means to assist in the 
formulation of science and technology policies. 
However, to be able to assess and use the results 
of foresight exercises it may be helpful to learn 
from errors in past future studies. This article 
looks at some of the difficulties in forecasting 
identified by historians (of course there are many 
more; see Olsson, 1999). It will also discuss 
what groups have been involved in fore-
casting and what incentives and interests they 
may have had. 
Excessively sweeping changes have 
been expected 
The historian of technology Joseph Corn has 
identified several common mistakes in 
connection with prediction (Corn, 1986). One 
such mistake has been to form a picture of 
excessively far-reaching changes, with an 
expectation that a new technology will entirely 
replace an existing one in a particular field. The 
view taken of atomic power in the 1940s and 
1950s is a case in point. The American press, in 
particular, described enthusiastically how this 
apparently inexhaustible source of free energy 
would completely replace traditional sources (Del 
Sesto, 1986). The days of producing electricity in 
large hydroelectric power stations were past -
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instead there would be small, compact atomic 
power plants for use both at work and at home. 
The fact that the technology could be created on 
a small scale would also enable it to be used as a 
source of power for vehicles, ships and aircraft. 
The predictions Included atomic cars, which 
would never need to stop for petrol because a 
small tablet of atomic fuel would last for years. 
Corn also points out that in predictions of total 
change it has often been assumed that these 
processes will take place quite quickly. In reality 
it has taken a long time for a new technology to 
be sufficiently developed to become widely 
diffused. Another factor which may delay the 
triumphal march of a new technology is that 
earlier technology may improve considerably 
when exposed to competition. One example of 
this is the improvement in the efficiency of sailing 
ships during the second half of the nineteenth 
century in response to the challenge of the new 
steamships (Rosenberg, 1976). 
Solve old problems 
Another common mistake, according to Corn, is 
to believe that a new technology will be applied 
only to old problems, an error which has often 
been made when forecasters extrapolate the 
historical course of events into the future. This 
approach, unlike the previous one, tends to result 
in the new technology being credited with far too 
little potential for producing change. The problem 
here is that these forecasters do not realize that a 
particular technology may, in the different social 
context of the future, fulfil quite different functions. 
A historical example of this is radio, which was 
seen initially as a wireless telegraph for point-to-
point communication in situations where there was 
no access to a cable, for example between a ship 
and stations on shore. The new technology was to 
function as a complement to existing telegraphy 
systems. What could not be anticipated was that 
within a couple of decades this wireless telegraph 
would have found its most important area of 
application - as a one-way communication channel 
for entertainment, advertising and news distribution 
(Douglas, 1987). 
Another, more topical, example is the computer. 
Computers were originally developed for advanced 
mathematical calculation. The designers of the first 
computers in the 1930s and 1940s saw them as 
scientific instruments - useful primarily for research 
or for military purposes. The fact that the 
technology might find a broader area of application 
- for example in word processing and games -
could not be anticipated. In those circumstances 
pronouncements such as that it would be possible 
to meet the USA's entire future need for calculating 
capacity with four or five computers become quite 
understandable (Ceruzzi, 1986). 
Several technologies can be combined 
The economic historian Nathan Rosenberg has 
also noted the difficulty of envisaging the future of 
a technology. One important problem in his 
opinion is that development in one area of 
technology is often dependent on development in 
other areas. He cites the example of laser 
technology (Rosenberg, 1994). When this first saw 
the light of day in the 1960s its potential usefulness 
was far from clear. As fibre optics developed, 
however, an important area of application 
emerged, namely in telecommunications. The 
impetus behind current development in both these 
areas comes from the realization of the possibility 
of combining the two. Such connections, often 
unexpected, between two different technologies 
are naturally very hard to predict. 
Locked into the spirit of the time 
Another researcher who has studied visions of 
the future is the economist Steven Schnaars. He 
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One common in ¡stake 
is to form a picture 
of excessively fár-
reaching changes, in the 
expectation that a new 
technology will entirely 
replace an existing one 
in a particular field 
Predictions often 
underestimate the time 
a new technology, icill 
lake to get established. 
One reason is that, 
faced with competition, 
the existing technology 
may improve to meet 
the challenge 
On the other hand, the 
potential of a technology 
may be underestimated 
by assuming that it will 
only be used to tackle 
existing problems 
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Tlie case of lasers and 
fibre optics shows how 
technologies can be 
combined in 
unpredictable ivays 
ici Ih far-reaching effects 
Prédictions about the 
future often say inore 
about the concents of 
the age that made them 
than about the shape 
technologies finally took 
Forecasters often become 
too fascinated by the 
technology and forget 
that in most cases it has 
to offer the user real, 
and affordable, 
. advantages 
points out that predictions are often set in the 
framework of a particular time and that studies of 
the future dating from the same period tend to 
focus on the same things. This is because the 
people who have devoted themselves to 
forecasting have been permeated by the 
prevailing spirit of the age (Zeitgeist). As a result, 
the visions of the future say more about the time 
when they arose than about the future as such 
(Schnaars, 1989). 
Every period has its ethos, which Schnaars sees 
as "marked by a predominant feature that 
characterizes the intellectual, political and social 
trends of that era." Examples of themes which 
predominate in the predictions from different 
periods in time are atomic power in the 1950s, 
the space race in the 1960s and energy questions 
in the 1970s. 
The big problem when studies of the future are 
coloured by the spirit of the age is that the people 
who have drawn a picture of the future often 
believe that the important questions of today will 
also be those of tomorrow, which usually turns 
out not to be the case. 
Price has to be weighed against 
performance 
Schnaars goes on to say that the commonest 
reason for the failure of forecasters to predict the 
future is that they have been too fascinated by the 
technology itself and more or less fallen in love 
with it, while tending to neglect economic and 
marketing aspects altogether. The predictions 
have failed because they have concerned 
innovations which did not offer the customer any 
real advantages and which were, in addition, 
more expensive than the technology they were 
intended to replace. One example is the 
picturephone, for which a bright future was 
predicted in the late 1960s. It was expensive and 
did not give the customer anything of real value. 
In most cases the conventional telephone was 
entirely satisfactory and if one nevertheless 
wanted to see the person with whom one was 
talking it was probable that one wanted to meet 
them personally. 
It is therefore very important for people 
working on visions of the future to carry out cost-
benefit analyses, i.e. to weigh the advantages of a 
technology to the users against the price they are 
going to have to pay. Schnaars emphasizes here 
that relatively few products have failed as a result 
of technical problems; failure is usually due to 
inadequate appraisal of the market situation. One 
difficulty in the application of strict cost-benefit 
analyses, however, is that most products are 
initially primitive and expensive. The question 
then is how soon the product may be expected to 
fall in price sufficiently to compete with existing 
products. A further difficulty is to come to grips 
with the way advertising affects the relation 
between competing products (Phillips, 1999). 
As a comparison, it should be noticed that 
assessments of the Japanese technology forecast 
surveys of 1971 and 1976 show that the main 
factor why predicted topics have not been 
realized was, in fact, technological problems. Of 
course, here too financial and social factors have 
been important (NISTEP, 1997). 
Symbolic values are strong incentives 
Schnaars' emphasis on economic aspects is of 
course very important. However it must be pointed 
out that these considerations have not always 
played a vital part in technical change. The 
historian of technology Svante Lindqvist has made 
the point that technology is often a product of 
considerations other than the rationally economic 
(Lindqvist, 1989). The American space programme 
of the 1960s provides an example. The official 
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justification for this programme was its presumed 
scientific and technological value to mankind, but 
the most important driving forces were symbolic 
and military. More specifically it was important 
during the Cold War to show the world that the 
USA was the leading nation in the technoscientific 
field. Once the goal ­ of being the first to put a man 
on the moon ­ had been attained, the balloon of the 
space programme burst. 
According to Lindqvist, predicting the future is 
made more difficult by the fact that a large part of 
all technological development takes place within 
the military sector. Even in a democratic society 
the necessary knowledge is not available to 
forecasters. 
Who carried out the future studies and 
what were their underlying interests? 
Who are the people who have tried to foresee 
the technology and the society of the future? To 
return to the example of atomic power in the 
1940s, it may be said that those who painted the 
most magnificent visions were often laymen: 
usually journalists but sometimes leading officials 
and politicians. One mistake they made was in 
failing to visualize the problems in developing 
atomic power ­ they underestimated the safety 
risks and overestimated the simplicity of 
developing small lightweight units. 
Scientists were generally more sceptical. 
Many stated in the late 1940s that the vision of 
providing cars, locomotives and houses with 
small atomic power plants for energy production 
was totally unrealistic ­ not least because of 
the radiation risks. One physicist wryly observed 
that nobody would need a car that ran for a 
whole year on a little uranium pellet because 
spending just five minutes in the car would be 
enough to give the driver a fatal dose of radiation 
(Boyer, 1985). 
The fact that experts have sometimes had a 
fairly realistic view of the potential of various 
predictions must not mislead us into believing that 
all scientists and engineers have seen clearly the 
probable course of future development. One 
writer who is critical of the ability of experts to 
visualize the technology of the future is Arthur C. 
Clarke. Unlike Corn, he claims that the trouble 
with most forecasts is that they have been far too 
conservative (Clarke, 1973). It is possible that his 
opinion reflects the fact that he has for the most 
part studied how leading scientists have viewed 
the future. Clarke considers that scientists have 
often lacked imagination. They have said, for 
example, that aircraft and space rockets were 
unrealistic, although they have possessed enough 
knowledge to have suspected what was going to 
happen, says Clarke. Expert knowledge has 
therefore almost been a handicap: "It is not the 
man who knows most about a subject, and is the 
acknowledged master of his field, who can give 
the most reliable pointers to its future. Too great a 
burden of knowledge can clog the wheels of 
Imagination." 
Predictions concerning the future have ¡n other 
words been made by both laymen and experts of 
various kinds. Naturally different groups have had 
different underlying interests, which should be 
remembered when assessing their predictions. 
Corn says that journalists and writers of popular 
science often have more reason to indulge in 
sensation and exaggeration because then they can 
obtain greater attention and a wider audience for 
what they write. For scientists the situation has 
been the reverse: they have often had an interest 
in being cautious in their visions ­ not least to 
avoid earning a bad reputation among fellow­
scientists. According to Corn, scientists' "training, 
their work experience, and their professional 
culture all [...] tended to dispose them toward 
more restrained and less utopian expectations for 
the future" (Corn, 1986). 
%* 
15 
Despite their cost, some 
technologies may 
nevertheless be 
developed for strategic 
or symbolic reasons 
Predictions made by 
laymen tend to be more 
utopian Ihan those 
made by scientists, 
whereas experts are 
often overly cautious 
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People toorking with 
techn ology foresights 
today usually have 
different perspectives, 
methods and aims 
than their predecessors 
in the field 
Conclusions 
People working with technology foresights 
today usually have different perspectives, 
methods and aims than their predecessors in the 
field. However, on a basic level they face a similar 
set of problems in trying to present views of the 
future. Even though they may have learned from 
past experiences and avoided some common 
errors it is reasonable to assume that they will 
have encountered difficulties at some other 
points. Since the results of technology foresights 
among other things will be used as the basis in 
determining priorities and drawing up policy, to 
European politicians and policymakers is essential 
to have knowledge of often recurrent mistakes of 
past visions of the future. 
This article has outlined a number of factors, 
which have contributed to the fact that 
predictions have failed. While the seven factors 
below are not sufficient for assessing present-day 
future studies they offer a point of departure. 
Reasons for failure have been: 
• The belief that new technology wil l 
completely replace existing technology and do 
so relatively quickly. In reality, competing 
technologies usually co-exist for a long period. 
• The belief that new technology will only solve 
old problems and supplement existing 
technical systems. Instead it is common for 
new technologies to form the basis of entirely 
new systems. 
• The difficulty of seeing important links 
between different areas of technology where it 
is actually the combination of fields that offers 
the greatest potential for development. 
• Forecasters have been caught in the spirit of a 
particular period and tended to believe that the 
great issues of today will also be those of 
tomorrow. 
• Forecasters have been seduced by the 
technology itself and thus neglected important 
economic aspects. They have not considered 
potential markets and whether a particular 
technology offers users anything more 
valuable than existing alternatives - there has 
been an absence of cost-benefit analyses. 
• Rational economic considerations are not the 
only factor influencing the choice of a new 
technology. Other considerations such as 
symbolic values often tip the scales. 
• Studies of the future have often been based on 
inadequate information. Much technological 
development takes place in secret - especially 
in the military sector. 
It may well be valuable to policy-makers to 
familiarize themselves with these factors and to 
examine today's visions of the future critically. In 
doing this one should bear in mind what different 
groups of actors have been involved in the foresight 
projects and what have been their underlying 
interests, assumptions and perspectives. 
It should be noted that the factors suggested 
above are based on earlier experience of visions of 
the future. Experience of foresight activities of the 
1990s still need to be studied critically and here the 
current ESTO-project on the monitoring of European 
foresight activities can play an important role, 
offering additional tools to aid in the assessment of 
such exercises. In doing this the ESTO-projects will 
have to deal with the, in many respects, difficult task 
of studying the present time or the recent past. Not 
least, it may be useful to stop and reflect on the spirit 
of the current age and on the questions which 
absorb us at the present time. To obtain a 
perspective from which to view today's projects we 
should ask ourselves what future historians -
perhaps working in the 2040s - will write about the 
European technology foresights of the 1990s. 
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As the recent WTO 
meeting in Scalile 
showed, it is often 
extremely difficult to 
achieve a. general 
consensus on 
multilateral free 
trade. One alternative 
approach is to 
implement agreements 
at regional level 
Economic Impacts of the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements 
S e r g i o G o m e z y Pa loma and M a r i o Z a p p a c o s t a , IPTS 
Issue: Following the wor ldwide tendency t o negotiate regional preferential trade 
agreements, a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area is due t o be created by the year 2010. 
This wil l be the outcome of the coming into force of bilateral agreements between the 
EU and Mediterranean Partner countr ies. 
Relevance: With several agreements still under negotiat ion, i t is wor th noting the 
importance of implementing accompanying measures in terms of structural reforms and 
technology changes in order to boost benefits and to reduce the costs of the new 
regional scenario. 
introduction 
T he troubled start of the recent WTO Millennium Round in Seattle shows how difficult it is to achieve a general consensus on multilateral free trade and 
market liberalization. A frequent way around this 
problem is to implement preferential trade 
agreements at regional level. Some significant 
examples of this approach are the European 
Economic Area between the EU and EFTA 
countries; the NAFTA agreement between 
Mexico, Canada and the US; the MERCOSUR 
treaty in South America; and the Free Trade 
agreements between the EU and Central and East 
European countries. 
Under the auspices of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, the Mediterranean region will also 
increased liberalization of the exchange of goods 
and services. By the year 2010 the implementation 
of a series of bilateral agreements will lead to the 
creation of a free trade area (FTA) comprising the EU 
and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). 
Negotiations towards these agreements began in 
1995 and have grown out of from the previous 
system of regional trade preferences already in 
place between EU and the MPCs. 
In order to be compatible with GATT and 
WTO rules on liberalization, regional free trade 
agreements must include at least two non-
discriminatory conditions: (¡) they have to be 
implemented gradually and (ii) they have to cover 
substantially all exchanges. 
Preferential trade agreements may have 
different impacts at global level. Viewed as 
second-best solution to a completely free market, 
they are seen as an initial step toward a more 
general liberalization. In fact, building on closer 
relationships between neighbouring countries, 
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they could induce a broader reduction of tariffs 
and duties. In some cases, regional free trade 
agreements have also led to deeper integration, 
including competition policies and antitrust laws 
(Hoeckman, 1998). On the other hand, they may 
create strong regional blocs that may turn 
protectionist, reducing access from the outside 
world (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994). 
Trade patterns and agreements in the 
Euro­Mediterranean region 
The MPCs' trade is mainly directed to EU, 
accounting for approximately 60% of total flows, 
with the exceptions of Israel and Jordan whose 
exports are more oriented to the USA and the Gulf 
countries, respectively. Maghrib countries are 
substantially more dependent on trade with the EU 
than Turkey and Egypt. Internal exchanges between 
MPCs represent less than 10% of the total volume, 
clue in particular to similarity in endowments and to 
political barriers. In 1997, MPC exports to the EU 
amounted to Euro48,797 million, while imports 
were Euro67,630 million. In absolute monetary 
terms, the group's largest trade partners with the EU 
are Turkey, Israel, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. 
On a global scale, MPCs specialize in expor­
ting minerals, fuels and manufactured goods 
(about 70% of total exports) and importing 
manufactured goods and raw materials (about 
70% of total imports). Agricultural trade between 
the MPCs and the EU is particularly important, 
representing approximately 50% of the total 
exchanges. This trade specializes in fresh and 
perishable goods, such as fruit and vegetables. 
The beginning of economic cooperation 
between the north and south of the Mediterranean 
basin dates back to the sixties when eight asso­
ciation agreements were signed. Their economic 
impact was essentially limited due to a lack of real 
coordination and the influence of nationalist 
interests resulting from former colonial ties. 
In the seventies, the EU launched the Global 
Mediterranean Policy. It granted preferential 
access to the EU from some Mediterranean 
Table 1. MPCs t rade with EU-15 
(values, million Euro, year 1997) 
Malta 
Cyprus 
Turkey 
Morocco 
Algeria 
Tunisia 
Libya 
Egypt 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Israel 
Jordan 
TOTAL 
Exports 
1,997 
1,931 
22,262 
5,307 
4,338 
5,276 
2,765 
6,715 
3,085 
1,345 
■11,418 
1,191 
67,630 
% 
2.95 
2.86 
32.92 
7.85 
6.41 . 
7.80 
4.09 
9.93 
4.56 
1.99 
16.88 
1.76 
Imports 
701 
373 
11,835 
4,738 
8,370 
4,005 
7,629 
2,578 
151 
1,995 
6,250 
. 172 
48,797 
% 
1.44 
0.76 
24.25 
9.71 
17.15 
8.21 
15.63 
5.28 
0.31 
4.09 
12.81 
0.35 
Source: Eurostat, 1998. 
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By the year 2010 the 
implementation of a 
seiies of bilateral 
agreements will lead to 
the creation of a free 
trade area (FTA) taking 
in the EU and the 
Meditetranean Partner 
Countries (MPCs) . 
The EU already 
accounts fm­
dl > proximately 60% of 
MPC trade, with the 
exception of Israel 
and Jordan 
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In Noveiìiber 1995, 
the new Euro-
Med i I erra neu n 
Partnership was 
established by the 
Conference of Foreign 
Ministers held in 
Barcelona, The 
initiative brought 
together 27 Partners 
from both sides of the 
Mediterranean 
products, such as citrus fruits, olive oil, melons, 
grapes, of which at the time the EU (then without 
Greece, Spain and Portugal) was a net importer. 
New negotiations of additional protocols began in 
the early eighties in order to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the southern enlargement of the EU on 
the MPCs. In general, all these agreements were 
characterized by giving duty free access to EU 
markets for the MPCs' industrial goods and 
preferential access for their agricultural 
commodities under the principle of the "most 
favoured nation", a guarantee that MPC exports 
are charged with tariffs no higher than those of the 
nation paying the lowest tariffs. 
In November 1995 the new Euro-Medi-
terranean Partnership was established by the 
Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Barcelona. 
The initiative brought together 27 Partners on both 
sides of the Mediterranean: the 15 EU Member 
States and Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey 
and the Palestinian Authority. The Barcelona 
Declaration is based on three main chapters: 
• The policy chapter, on defining a common 
area of peace and stability. 
• The economy and finance chapter, on building 
an area of shared prosperity. 
• The society and culture chapter, on bringing 
together people. 
The main features of the economy and finance 
chapter are the creation of a Free Trade Area 
(FTA), to be completed by year 2010, and the 
establishment of the MEDA programme as a 
specific financial assistance measure. The FTA 
wil l be achieved by establishing Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) 
between each Mediterranean Partner Country 
(MPC) and the EU member states. Table 1 shows 
the current status of negotiations and it is worth 
noting that by the end of 1999 only EMAAs with 
Tunisia and Palestinian Authority had come into 
force. This delay is mainly due to the long 
ratification process by EU member states: for 
example, by the end of 1999, the agreement with 
Jordan signed in November 1997 had been 
ratified only by 7 member states. 
Although each EMAA is independently 
designed and negotiated, they have the following 
common characteristics. 
Table 2. Progress of negotiations on 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
Partner 
Tunisia 
Israel 
Morocco 
Turkey 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Jordan 
Egypt 
Lebanon 
Algeria 
Syria 
Source: European Commission 
Conclusion 
June 1995 
September 1995 
November 1995 
March 1995 
December 1996 
April 1997 
June 1999 
In progress 
In progress 
In progress 
1999 
Signature 
of Negotiations 
July 1995 
November 1995 
February 1996 
December 1995-
February 1997 
November 1997 
June 1999 
-
-
-
Entry ¡ntoForce 
of Agreement 
March 1998 
-
'-
-
July 1997 
-
-
-
-
-
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• Their duration is unlimited and their content 
may be modified only by subsequent 
amendments. 
• They envisage a progressive elimination of all 
tariffs on industrial goods, which will be 
completed by the year 2010. 
• Bilateral trade liberalization of agricultural 
products is gradual and limited. Further 
negotiations on agricultural concessions are 
expected to start in the near future (in the year 
2000 for Tunisia and Morocco and in the year 
2002 for Lebanon and Jordan). 
• They include measures to liberalize services 
and the right of establishment of foreign direct 
investments (FDI). 
• They consider the adoption of a wide range of 
trade-related EU regulations, such as 
Competition Policy, Intellectual Property 
Rights regulations, standards harmonization 
and customs administration procedures. 
In reality, tariff reduction wil l be almost 
unilateral, concerning mainly industrial products 
of EU origin, given that the majority of 
Mediterranean products already have free access 
to EU markets. Goods that will first experience 
tariff abolition are generally intermediate and 
capital goods that are not produced in MPCs and 
have the lowest average tariffs, while consumer 
goods and products with the highest tariffs will 
be liberalized more gradually (see table 3 on 
the Tunisian case). Although fresh agricultural 
products are almost excluded from the 
agreements, processed foods are included in 
product groups with the longer transition period 
(up to 12 years for total tariff abolition). 
Reviewing major economic impacts 
Mainstream international trade theory holds 
that countries with large Import-substitution 
programmes, which can lead to inefficient 
diversification, can increase their national welfare 
by moving to export-oriented production in a more 
liberal market. Capital and human resources would 
be reallocated to sectors and firms able to pursue 
higher productivity levels and, consequently, 
compete on international (unprotected) markets. 
Several authors have analysed the economic impact 
of EAAs on the MPCs' economies and their major 
findings may be summarized as follows: 
• Trade diversion. This is a negative effect 
which occurs when granting preferential 
treatment to specific countries as the 
Table 3. Tariff liberalization commitments by Tunisia 
Year 1994 
Immediate liberalization 
5 years transition 
12 years transition 
Share of trade 
Export Import 
1 
16 
7 
10 
24 
29 
Share in 
domestic 
output 
14 
20 
22 
Share in 
total tariff 
revenue 
3.6 
12.5 
9.2 
Import 
weighted 
average tariff 
21.6 
26.7 
30.4 
8 years transition 
starting from year 5 
Exempted 
75 36 43 32.9 33.Í 
n/a n/a 
Source: Hoekman and Djankov, 1996 
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Ώιβ α im of trade 
liberalizai ion is to 
increase national 
welfare by moving 
away from inefficient 
diversification toward 
export-oriented-
- production. However, 
among the direct 
negative consequences 
are transitional 
unemployment and loss 
of tax revenue 
Tlie relatively high level 
of tariffs has meant a 
long (12-year) 
transitional period is 
necessary, although this 
may create biases 
in investors' decisions 
as different sectors 
are liberalized at 
different rales 
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elimination of tariffs may induce consumers 
and firms to prefer suppliers located in a 
partner country that are less efficient than 
those located in non-member countries1. In 
the case of the EAAs, the dismantling of 
import tariffs on EU products may negatively 
affect import flows from other MPCs 
(Hoekman, 1998). Trade diversion losses may 
be limited by two factors: (i) greater 
competitiveness of EU suppliers (i.e. their 
production performance is closer to that of the 
most efficient country and the distortion 
introduced by the EAAs is minimum), and (ii) 
lower import tariffs on EU products that will 
be eliminated by EMAAS (Tovias, 1997). 
• Trade creation. This is a positive effect and 
refers to the replacement of higher-cost 
domestic production with lower-cost imports. 
It counterbalances the trade diversion effect if 
there is similarity between MPCs and EU 
economies and, consequently, there is scope 
for improvement in resource allocation. 
• Transitional unemployment. In the short run, 
capital reallocation and consequent enterprise 
closures will affect MPCs' job markets. In 
particular, MPCs with high unemployment 
rates and inefficient state-owned enterprises 
would be the hardest hit. In the case of Tunisia, 
for example, one estimate of the costs of 
shifting and retraining workforce places ¡t at 
4% of national GDP and the whole 
restructuring process wil l involve 
approximately 8% of the active workforce. 
(Rutheford et al., 1995). 
• Tax revenue loss. Granting duty free access to 
imports of EU origin implies a reduction in 
total governmental revenue. In general, it 
would be quite significant, depending on the 
pre-agreement amount of fiscal revenue drawn 
from international trade taxes. For example, 
when the EAAs will be fully implemented, 
losses are estimated to be 5.4% of total 
government revenue for Algeria (1.5% of 
GDP), 4.4% for Egypt (1.4% of GDP), 11.1% 
for Morocco (2.9% of GDP), 24.3% for Tunisia 
(6.0% of GDP) (Tovias, 1997). 
• Attracting domestic and foreign investments. 
The bilateral nature of the EMAAs may create 
incentives to locate firms in the EU in order to 
have simultaneous access to all MPCs, 
according the so-called "hub and spoke" 
strategy. To reduce the isolation of the 
"spokes" and to upgrade some of them to 
regional "hubs", intra-MPCs trade should be 
improved by reducing trade barriers between 
individual countries (Petri, 1997). For this 
purpose, 18 countries of the Arab League 
launched the "Arab Free Trade Area" aiming at 
gradually lowering regional custom duties by 
10 percent per year. This process started in 
February 1998 and it should be fully 
implemented by 2008. In addition, several 
bilateral agreements are under negotiation, 
such as for example, those between Jordan and 
Egypt, Morocco and Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan. The reforms that are expected to 
accompany the EMAAs will contribute to 
reducing market uncertainty, enhancing the 
credibility of local government and the 
commitment to a fully market-based and open 
economy and, consequently, help attract 
foreign direct investments (Ghesquiere, 1998). 
• Bias in capital allocation due to gradual tariff 
liberalization. The long period for tariff 
abolishment (12 years) is due to the high level 
of import duties in MPCs and the need to 
smooth out fiscal losses. In comparison with 
CEECs (Central and Eastern European 
Countries), the average level of MPCs 
protection is almost double (6% as compared 
with 15%). The gradual liberalization process 
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may have some negative effects due to the 
increasing relative protection for highly 
protected sectors in the earlier period. It might 
bias potential investors' decisions and delay 
investments in export-oriented industries. In 
particular, the higher protection granted to 
MPCs' agriculture may induce new distortions 
resulting in resources flow from the industrial 
sectors with dismantling protection. In addition, 
the sequencing of tariff reductions may 
strengthen resistance to future market opening. 
• Harmonization of standards. Although the 
harmonization with EU standards is achieved 
through bilateral agreements, the whole set of 
EMAAs will de facto provide the Mediterranean 
region with common standards, bypassing long 
and frequently difficult intra-MPCs negotiations. 
Accompanying measures: structural 
reforms and technology changes 
Sound reallocation of capital and human 
resources and attracting investments need more 
than just tariff abolition on a bilateral basis. In order 
to enhance the positive impacts of EMAAs and 
reduce the negative ones, MPCs need to implement 
some accompanying measures in terms of 
structural reforms and technology changes. 
The impact of EMAAs on government revenue 
may be partially offset by public expenditure 
reduction and by introducing alternative revenue 
sources, such as the introduction of value added 
taxes. On the other hand, government should 
provide safety nets and re-training programmes to 
workers displaced by the restructuring process. 
The negative effects of trade diversion may be 
reduced if greater integration of MPCs is 
promoted. The implementation of bilateral and 
diagonal "cumulation of origins" rules would 
reduce the isolation of "spokes", improving 
market access for MPCs to the EU, increasing 
trade among MPCs and enlarging sourcing 
possibilities for materials and products. In the case 
of bilateral cumulation, products originating in 
the EU could be processed by an MPC and then 
get duty-free access the EU. When there are more 
than two countries involved, all of them 
participating in the Free Trade Area, although on 
bilateral basis, diagonal cumulation may take 
place: products originating in an MPC could be 
processed by another MPC and be sold duty free 
either in the EU or in another MPC even without 
proof of sufficient transformation. For example, 
Tunisia may buy phosphates from Morocco in 
order to produce complex fertilizers to be sold 
duty free to the EU. It is important to note that 
cumulation rules apply only to "originating 
products", a feature that, except for the majority of 
agricultural products, is often difficult to assess. 
The development of regional trade would also 
have effects in terms of technology. By granting 
access to MPCs' suppliers who might provide 
machinery more suitable to local skills and factor 
endowments than those from the EU, technology 
diversification may be encouraged. On the other 
hand, greater market competition may devastate 
MPCs' industrial fabric, which is based on networks 
of small and medium enterprises, losing the so-
called "social capital" in terms of locally developed 
systems of firm organization and management. 
Standardization in the production process due to 
the growing presence of multinationals in MPCs 
could result in the gradual loss of local management 
culture and technologies (Zghal, 1998). 
National and foreign investors would favour 
locating in MPCs only if they find a sound 
business environment there, in addition to a 
relatively cheap labour force. The imple­
mentation of reforms of legal and regulatory 
systems is a basic requisite. At the same time, it 
is important to upgrade the quality of local 
«j , «ft. 
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One feature of α 
regional agreement 
based on bilateral 
agreements is the 
creation of a "hub and 
spoke" arrangement in. 
which there is little 
trade between the MPCs 
themselves. Difficulties 
can also arise in terms 
of determining 
the origins of 
tariff-exempt goods 
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Investors will not be 
i nil need to locate in the 
MPCs by low labour 
costs alone. They also 
require a sound 
business environment, 
making legal and 
regulatory reform 
essential 
infrastructure and services such as banks, 
finance, insurance and telecommunications. In 
particular, the reduction of local monopoly 
power in ICTs wil l contribute to enhancing the 
adoption of new technologies. 
The location attractiveness for export industries 
in MPCs will be increased by the elimination of 
several non-tariff barriers such as the existence of 
complex and wide-ranging customs administration 
requirements, diverse testing and certification 
procedures, numerous documents for customs 
clearance, and the lack of coordination and 
cooperation on linking customs computer systems. 
An important role has been played by the EU 
MEDA programme, which progressively replaced 
previous financial instruments, mainly the 
Financial Protocols, and currently represents about 
90% of total financial commitmentsfrom the EU 
budget in the Mediterranean. This programme 
supports MPCs' economic transition and structural 
adjustment, with particular emphasis on private 
sector development. An important feature of the 
MEDA programme is that the fund allocation per 
country is not predetermined, as under 1970s and 
1980s agreements, but it will be determined on the 
basis of the pace of the reforms implemented. 
Conclusions 
The EMAAs may become a catalyst for MPCs' 
economic reform and modernization strategies 
if local governments commit themselves 
to implementing a set of complementary and 
supplementary economic policy measures. In 
this framework, economic and technical 
cooperation from the EU may play a pivotal 
role. Drawing on its vast experience, the 
EU should help MPCs in the harmonization of 
diverse regulations, making available inter-
nationally accepted rules and procedures, e.g. 
customs and standards requirements. 
The EMAAs, as with any other preferential 
free trade agreement, may be seen as the 
first step towards a greater regional and 
worldwide integration that would reduce 
the costs of trade diversion and reduce the 
"hub and spoke" phenomenon between 
MPCs and EU. Evidently generalized trade 
liberalization would imply further losses in 
fiscal revenues and would need extra 
compensating measures. 
In order to adapt to stronger competition 
on international markets the upgrading of MPCs 
industrial enterprises and the environment 
where they operate is needed. Programmes 
aimed at facilitating technology change, 
vocational training and retraining, improvements 
in legal and regulatory framework, especially on 
standards harmonization and export possibilities 
awareness, are measures which would benefit 
from cooperatio_nbetween national governments 
and the EU. 
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Patents are generally 
field to ci-eate an 
important incentive 
for innovation by 
providing a means of 
recouping large 
investments i η research 
and development 
Tlie economic argument 
for patent protection 
is the apparent market 
failure in that 
intellectual property 
would otherwise be too 
easy to exploit in ways 
which do not benefit 
its creator 
Patenting as a Protection Tool: 
A Reassessment 
N i k o l a u s T h u m m , IPTS 
Issue: Patents are often said to be an important incentive for research and development. 
However, patents are nowadays being used in ways that are very different f rom their 
original concept and aims of protect ing inventions and fostering their distr ibut ion. 
Relevance: Strategic uses of patenting are predominating over the idea of protect ion and 
distr ibut ion of knowledge. In a t ime of rapid changes in the legal framework of patenting 
and doubts about the patentabil ity of many inventions, for example in biotechnology, the 
original policy aim of the patent instrument seems to be more and more neglected. 
The aim of patenting 
P atents are widely held to be an important incentive for research and development. Like other intellectual property rights they are a necessary provision for science and 
technology to progress. Without patents there 
would be no incentive to spend large amounts on 
research and development (the so-called innovation 
effect of patents). In the absence of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) pirates can copy inventions, 
meaning little or no original development would be 
undertaken, which would have disastrous 
consequences for the general development of 
science and technology. 
The economic argument for IPRs is that there 
is a market failure in the case of technological 
knowledge. Technological knowledge is a public 
good. Producers of knowledge cannot prevent 
others from using it (the so-called non-excludability 
characteristic). Intellectual property can be used 
and enjoyed jointly by as many as care to make use 
of it without affecting the level at which others use 
it (the so-called non-rivalry characteristic). In 
economic terms, the marginal costs of providing 
intellectual objects to an additional user are nil. 
Under free-market conditions the public good 
features produce an 'overuse' of intellectual 
property and a loss of incentive for investment in 
activities which create intellectual property (R&D 
investments). This is the usual argument why 
government intervention in the form of intellectual 
property rights is required. Through publicly 
accessible publications, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) ensure a wider distribution of technological 
knowledge (positive distribution effect of patents). 
Economic analysis, however, also makes 
it clear that from a welfare point of view that 
IPRs are only a second best solution. They give 
rise to sub-optimal production levels and 
monopolistic market prices. Nevertheless, there 
is a need for this second best solution, and a 
certain deviation from optimally is the price paid 
for innovative activity. 
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Table 1. Knowledge classification 
(Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1990) 
Codified Tacit 
Public e.g. Publications Generic, e.g. Skills 
Proprietary e.g. Patents Firm-specific skills e.j Know-how 
Are patents suitable for the 
technologies of the new millennium? 
Patents cover per definition only the codifiable 
dimension of knowledge (see table 1). 
With the rise of the "information society" the 
quantity of codified knowledge looks set to 
increase. Knowledge is becoming more and more 
the essential resource in what is called the 
"learning society", where learning is the most 
important process for wealth creation. This 
is increasingly placing IPRs at centre of the 
public debate. 
Nevertheless, IPRs refer only to codifiable 
knowledge and it is not always clear what the 
proportion of codifiable knowledge is in any new 
invention (in comparison with the tacit dimension 
of knowledge). With the rise in importance of 
knowledge and skills, the tacit dimension for new 
and high-tech technologies is probably increasing 
more than the relevance of codified knowledge. 
This is mainly due to an ongoing increase in the 
complexity of technologies that require deeper 
understanding and problem solving capacity from 
trained staff'. Consequently, the importance of 
IPR is not necessarily rising in a knowledge-based 
society, rather this depends on the kind of 
knowledge involved. 
The business of patenting 
Industry understands patents above all as an 
instrument for making money. Patents are used for 
licensing and the aim is to exploit them as far as 
possible for economic gain. 
More and more companies are realizing that 
aggressively asserting their patents can generate 
considerable business advantages. Many busi-
nesses spend large amounts of money in identifying 
the economically relevant patents out of their 
patent portfolio (Portfolio audit), as well as in 
cluster and bracket analysis, where clustering 
around the core technology has to make sure that a 
core technology has been protected. Efforts have to 
be made to oversee the patent's ageing process 
(i.e. the number of years left on a company's 
patents) tracking which inventors are still with the 
company or if they work with a competitor, and of 
course most importantly, identifying candidates for 
out-licensing. Therefore, different licensing 
approaches are followed. Either through personal 
in-depth contacts or through a "shotgun approach" 
-flooding all the competitors in a particular 
technology with patent license solicitation letters, 
licensees are identified. 
Barriers to patenting 
Patenting is an expensive business; the cost of 
maintaining worldwide coverage for a single patent 
has been estimated to be as much as $250,000 
(Derwent,1999). This cost, which includes the fees 
of patent lawyers plus the application and 
maintenance fees, makes patenting an exclusive 
instrument available only to those who can afford 
it. In addition to the cost, the in-depth knowledge 
needed to understand and use the patenting 
process creates a barrier which is especially 
difficult for smaller companies to cross. It is 
therefore not surprising to see that the relative 
importance of patenting related costs (procedural 
Patents, and Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) 
in general, are only able 
to protect the codifiable 
pait of any invention or 
creation and do not 
cover tacit knowledge 
Businesses are finding 
new ways to use 
patents to protect their 
technologies and exploit 
them through 
licensing agreements 
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Applying for, 
. maintaining and, if 
necessary, defending a 
patent is an expensive 
business; often beyond 
the means of small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises 
Tlie complexities of 
the patenting system 
create a situation that 
encourages strategic 
uses of patents to 
predominate over 
the idea of protection 
and distribution 
of knowledge 
costs, patent lawyer's fees etc, annual renewal fees 
etc, litigation costs) for the decision to apply for 
patent protection decreases with the size of the firm 
(cf. Thumm, 2000). Costs are in general of greatest 
importance for small firms, whereas larger firms 
naturally find them less of a burden. 
Also the costs of litigation can be very high, 
especially in the United States. This burden may 
often not be taken into account when deciding to 
patent. European firms usually assume that they 
will not get into legal battles over infringement 
and in practice indeed cases are rare in 
comparison to the United States. In general, all 
the administrative costs are secondary to the large 
sums spent on patent lawyers and translations2. 
High translation costs are one reason for the 
difficulties of adopting a community patent for the 
European Union. Usually companies do not 
hesitate to file a priority application at national 
level. Costs start to come up only later, after 
twelve months of priority time together with the 
decision to apply for international protection. 
There, smaller and medium sized enterprises 
usually have to be very selective about the choice 
of countries in which to apply for protection. 
Box 1: Example of how patent-holders can 
manipulate the system 
After 18 years the patent claim is withdrawn 
by simply not paying the 19th yearly fee. The 
patent office sends off a reminder letter after 
a period of 6 months with an additional fee of 
10%. Until the status of expiry is in the 
databases, 19,75 years will have passed. 
Thus the public (including competitors!) become 
aware of the dropped patent more or less after 
the full length patent protection period of 20 
years. The firm however, saves the expensive 
patent fee (Eurol.OOO per country for maybe 10 
countries). In the case of large firms with many 
patents per year strategies such as this can save 
a huge amount of money overall. 
Costs for international applications, especially 
when a patent gets into the national phase are 
tremendous. Hence firms tend to look for ways in 
order to reduce these costs, as in the example 
in Box 1. 
The complexities of the patenting system 
create a situation encouraging strategic uses of 
patents to predominate over the idea of protection 
and distribution of knowledge. Thus, Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998) warn of the negative 
consequences of excessive patenting, in particular 
for the biotechnology industry, a situation they 
refer to as "the tragedy of the anti-commons". All 
these considerations make it clear that patents are 
probably an indicator of a number of things, but 
not necessarily innovation. 
Strategic reasons for patenting 
"Even within the domain of patenting, there 
are almost infinite variations of patent strategy: 
what to protect and when, where to file, how to 
improve competitive position, etc." (European 
Commission, 1999). 
The purposes for which companies make use 
of their patent portfolios are very diverse, but 
generally fall into the following categories: 
• Protection from competition; 
• Complementary protection; 
• Safeguarding future technologies; 
• Basis for alliances. 
The first of these purposes is the closest to the 
original intention of patents, i.e. to prohibit those 
others than the inventors from commercializing 
the patented technology. 
Complementary protection is the protection 
around a core technology which itself has no direct 
commercial purpose but aims to protect a key 
patent that needs a higher degree of protection. The 
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associated area can be safeguarded by patenting all 
possible varieties of one original invention. 
Examples are patents on all possible mixtures of a 
highly efficient chemical substance. Another 
example is a firm that tries to patent the entire 
production process, and hence applies for as many 
patents as possible for one product. As a result, 
competitors have to approach this firm and apply 
for licensing whenever they want to produce 
something in this area. Large pharmaceutical 
companies follow another, similar strategy. They 
file for as many patents as possible in one 
technological field. The intention is to occupy the 
entire field, even though individual patents may not 
be of interest ("blocking scenario"). Such behaviour 
makes the technological field unattractive for any 
potential market entrant. In fact, this is strongly 
recommended by experts, since otherwise firms 
may be locked out of future technological develop-
ment by their competitors. The principle of 
protecting the associated area of an invention is 
also an economic need since, if it is not done by 
the inventor him or herself, any competitor can 
take the initiative and place a patent in the 
technological niche. 
Similar strategies are recommended with 
respect to the protection of future technologies. 
Here, the company has to make sure that it has a 
prior claim to a specific area of technology and 
that it will participate in the future commer-
cialization of this technology without relying on 
the patent portfolio of a competitor. 
Patents as a basis for alliances are patents that 
aim at moving the holder into a better negotiating 
position against competitors (swap patents). An 
example is the patenting of diverse mixtures of an 
invented chemical substance. In order to prevent 
the patenting of an invention by a competitor, the 
inventor includes in the patent file the name of all 
substances invented, a cross dependency is 
created and thereby a better negotiation position 
for cross licensing is established. Another 
example therefore is a combination therapy 
for AIDS. In this case the virus cannot be 
combated in an efficient way with single 
therapies, but only with the right combination of 
therapies. Hence, a patent application for one 
therapy would designate all the competitors' 
inventions (therapies). 
Another more aggressive way of swap 
patenting is the case where a basic technology is 
already patented and a competitor intends to 
obtain as many patents as possible on secondary 
applications of this technology, so that the first 
patent owner finds him or herself in a dependent 
position. One example is the case of research into 
a new drug against cancer in which a competitor 
patents any combination of the anti-cancer 
compounds, whether useful or not, and 
independently of whether there is a synergistic 
effect or not. The competitor could build up a 
large patent portfolio without any evidence to 
support the potential development of any of his 
proposed inventions into a marketable product. 
This is particularly the case since patenting itself 
does not necessarily mean that somebody brings a 
product successfully onto the market. 
All the mentioned purposes can be used in a 
defensive way as well as in an offensive way, 
aiming more at hindering competitors than 
protecting one's own inventions. This depends 
very much on the coherent patenting strategy of a 
single firm. The various strategic uses of patenting 
are not limited to large firms. Small and medium-
sized biotechnology businesses, naturally 
restrained by their economic resources, also use 
strategic patenting in order to achieve competitive 
advantages without expending too much of their 
own resources. In a way, small companies depend 
even more on patenting than larger ones, since 
often their patent portfolio is the only economic 
asset they have. 
\5 
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In an aggressive f omi 
of what is known as 
swap patenting a 
competitor tries to 
obtain as many patents 
as possible on 
secondary applications 
of an existing basic 
technology 
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Offensive use of 
patenting normally 
tries to exclude 
competitors from 
making use of a 
technology by patenting 
numerous combinations 
or variations of it 
The various possibilities for strategic uses of 
patenting include: 
• Offensive use; 
• Defensive use; 
• Negotiation; 
• Improving the image of the company. 
The first prerequisite of strategic pate-
nting is the active observation of competitors' 
patenting portfolios, which is already nece-
ssary in orderto identify market niches and 
to place products in the right place in the 
market. The outcome of one survey was that 
89 per cent of the survey respondents agree 
that monitoring the patents of competitors is 
an effective way of obtaining competitive 
intelligence (Derwent, 1998). 
Offensive use of patenting normally tries to 
exclude competitors from making use of a 
technology. An example of an offensive use of 
patenting is again that of patenting various 
mixtures of a chemical substance. An expert in the 
field will observe economically useful mixtures 
and will file a patent on each of them. If this is 
done by a competitor and not the original 
inventor, the inventor will depend on a secondary 
patent. Conditions for cross licensing will be 
established and even though the competitor 
cannot make any direct use of his secondary 
patent, it will at least disturb the original inventor 
and place the competitor in a favourable 
negotiating position. This behaviour also 
demonstrates how this "gap management" is 
practised. It assumes the active control by the 
patenting portfolio of the competitor and looks for 
niches in which to place a patent (a pure "desk 
patent" to be put somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of a first "inventive" patent). 
Against such practices, firms list all compounds 
and possible mixtures in the patent specifications 
annexed to their patent application in order to 
block them against third parties. 
The defensive use of patenting, on the other 
hand, is more faithful to the protective element of 
patenting. Broad patent portfolios make sure that 
technologies can be used in the future. A patent-
portfolio in a specific technology can be a strong 
asset for negotiating cross-licensing agreements and 
the mere existence of a broad portfolio can 
intimidate a negotiating company. Finally, a strong 
patent portfolio boosts the image of a company 
even though the times where patent files served as 
office decoration are supposed to be over. 
Conclusion 
There are already serious concerns about over-
patenting and its negative effects. Heller and 
Eisenberg warns of too much biotechnological 
patenting, in particular of the deterrent effect of 
high transaction costs and the resulting "under-
use" of patented biotechnological information. 
Although ethical issues are not under discussion 
here, it has to be asked whether certain classes of 
knowledge ought to be in the public domain 
rather than in private hands where they are used 
for economic purposes. For example, patents on 
medical procedures have come in for a great deal 
of criticism. Society at large also has an interest in 
having certain technological knowledge publicly 
available for educational reasons. 
Although it is clear that patents are an important 
incentive for research and development, it is also 
clear that, in addition to their initial purpose of 
protection, patents are nowadays used in many 
different ways. The original idea of what patents are 
and should bep the intention of protecting 
inventions and fostering their distribution, is 
becoming less and less important in comparison 
with many secondary uses of patents. Property 
rights in general offer their owners a variety of 
strategic uses in the market place that are no longer 
conforming with the original idea of IPR as a 
remedy against market failure. "Intellectual 
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property rights have a dangerous inner logic .... 
Rational actors might use them to plan against the 
market" (Drahos, 1995). These secondary purposes 
of IPR dominate and take away from the original 
idea of supplying inventiveness and creativity. 
Nevertheless, they stimulate the innovator's interest 
in the property rights themselves and in the related 
payoffs. "Property rights in abstract objects push 
the invisible hand away; self-interest is released in 
ways that threaten the negative liberties of others" 
(Drahos, 1995). 
The time may have come for a wholesale 
reassessment of the patent-system (cf. Thurow's 
1997 article on the issue) especially with respect 
to new technologies. 
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Notes 
1. For example, computer programs include codified knowledge in ideal form where each step should 
be comprehensible throughout the programmed code. Size, the complexity of the program and 
individual freedom in the way of programming nevertheless often make individual programs 
incomprehensible and understanding them requires more than simply going through the lines of code. 
2. According to one evaluation (Strauss, 1997) the average cost of a European Patent with 8 designations 
comprises 22% external patent lawyer costs and 33% translation costs. 
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According to data 
gathered by the US 
Department of Justice, 
EU companies 
participated in 
approximately a third 
of research joint 
ventures in the US. 
Moreover, EU 
parlicipation has been 
fairly evenly spread 
across technology areas 
Participation of European Union Com-
panies in US Research Joint Ventures 
A l b e r t N. L i nk , University of North Carolina at Greensboro and 
N i c h o l a s S. Vo no r ta s, The George Washington University 
issue: European union (EU) companies frequently participate In us research jo in t 
ventures (RJVs). There has been, however, l itt le systematic work on the characteristics of 
the EU companies that are involved, about the RJVs themselves, or about the research 
objectives of the EU companies compared to those of US partners. 
Relevance: Recent work has examined the extent of involvement and the basic charac-
teristics of EU organizations that have participated in a distinct group of RJVs established 
in the United States during the past 15 years1. Information about the nature of EU partici-
pation in US RJVs could be useful to the European Commission in Its support of its own RJVs 
through the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development. 
introduction 
T he National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984, and its extension, the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993, offered 
antitrust protection to members of registered re-
search and production joint ventures (RJVs). By re-
gistering with the US Department of Justice, firms 
decreased the probability of being prosecuted for 
antitrust violations that stem from their cooperative 
research relationships (Hagedoorn, Link, and Vonor-
tas, 2000). Even though EU companies have been 
involved in about one-third of these US RJVs, there 
is a conspicuous lack of descriptive information on 
EU companies participating in these ventures. 
Description of EU Participation 
Since January 1 1985, 746 RJVs have been 
registered. As illustrated in Figure 1, the total num-
ber of new RJVs registered each year has 
followed a bell-shaped distribution, increasing on 
average during the first eleven years, reaching 
a peak in 1995, and decreasing dramatically 
thereafter. About one-third of the total number 
of RJVs (251) have involved at least one partner 
based in the EU (Figure 1). The extent to which 
EU entities2 have participated has varied 
considerably over the fourteen-year period, 
ranging from less than 20 percent of the newly 
registered RJVs to over 60 percent in a given 
year. 
EU-based entities have tended to participate 
relatively more in larger RJVs. Figure 2 illustrates 
this. EU companies have participated in not 
less than sixty-six percent of the registered RJVs with 
more than ten members and in more than fifty 
percent of the RJVs with more than five members. In 
contrast, they have participated in only seventeen 
percent of RJVs with two to five members. 
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Figure 1. New RJV Announcements 
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EU participation in RJVs has been fairly from other regions as well. Exclusive US­EU colla­
widespread across technology areas. Nine of the boration accounted for forty­five percent of the 
technical areas in Table 1 had ten or more RJVs cases, and there is no evidence of a change in 
with EU partners. Most of these are areas of preference of EU­based participants for one 
market strength for the European industry. membership mix over another. 
Figure 3 divides the 251 RJVs with EU There are 3,819 fully identified entities repres­
participants into two groups, those involving only ented within the 746 RJVs. Table 2 shows that 
US and EU entities and those involving entities 2,677 (75%) are US­based entities, followed by 
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Figure 3. RJVs with US, EU and/or Other Foreign Participants 
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Table 1. Primary Technical Areas of RJVs with EU Participants 
Technical 
Area 
Teleco­
mmunications 
Energy 
Environmental 
Computer Software 
Chemicals 
Transportation 
Advanced Materials 
Subassemblies 
& Components 
Factory Automation 
Test & Measurement 
Biotechnology 
Computer Hardware 
Manufacturing 
Equipment 
Photonics 
Medicals 
N/A 
Pharmaceuticals 
Total RJVs 
1985 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
9 
1986 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
11 
1987 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 
1988 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 ■ 
2 
1 
12 
1989 
3 
3 
5 
2 
1 
1 
15 
1990 
5 
2 
5 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
23 
1991 
5 
8 
6 
3 
5 
4 
1 
1 
2 
35 
1992 
3 
8 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
18 
1993 
5 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
23 
1994 
6 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
19 
1995 
2 
9 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
­1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
33 
1996 
3 
3 
6 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
23 
1997 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
16 
1998 Total 
RJVs 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
9 
40 
32 
32 
27 
26 
20 
19 
14 
10 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
251 
% 
15,94 
12,75 
12,75 
10.76 
10,36 
7,97 
7,57 
5,58 
3,98 
2,39 
1,99 
1,59 
1,59 
1,59 
1.20 
1.20 
0.80 
100 
© IPTS. No.43 - JRC - Seville. April 2000 
T h e IPTS R e p o r t 
180 being UK-based and 169 being Japan-based. 
Taking the EU as a whole, 562 separate entities 
(15%) have participated in the US-based RJVs. 
Strategic Motives for Participating 
in US-Based RJVs 
Two case studies were conducted as an initial 
effort to understand the strategic motives for 
participating in RJVs. To facilitate this exploratory 
investigation, the case studies dealt with RJVs that 
begun in 1996 (so that members could be 
identified and could reasonably identify research 
successes) and that had less than 15 members 
(since the organization structure of RJVs of this 
size may be more informal and thus increase the 
likelihood of participation in a survey question-
naire). The RJVs studied were MIPS ABI Croup, 
Inc and the Southwest Research Institute Clean 
Heavy Duty Diesel Engine II Project. 
Table 2. Identified Participating Entities by Country 
Country Entity 
US 
UK 
Japan 
Canada 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Australia 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Norway 
Mexico 
Belgium 
Finland 
Singapore 
Denmark 
Israel 
India 
Spain 
Hong Kong 
South Africa 
Austria 
Brazil 
2.677 
180 
169 
146 
116 
78 
48 
47 
39 
33 
32 
24 
21 
20 
18 
15 
14 
14 
14 
14 
11 
9 
7 
7 
7 
6 
Country 
Hungary 
Ireland 
China 
New Zealand 
Greece 
Portugal 
Saudi Arabia 
Colombia 
Venezuela 
Russia 
Luxembourg 
Argentina 
Costa Rica 
Czechoslovakia 
Estonia 
Europe 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Malaysia 
Poland 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Turkey 
West Indies 
Yugoslavia 
Entity 
5 
5 
5 
S 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
Total 3.819 
w 35 
Two research joint 
ventures (RJVs) were 
looked at; one in the 
software field and the 
other in engineering. A 
survey instrument was 
developed to obtain 
information on the 
strategic motives for 
participation 
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The nature and objectives of the MIPS ABI 
Group was to develop and endorse UNIX binary 
interface standards for MIPS processor-based 
systems. In the late 1980s, leading US companies 
in the computer industry relied on processor 
technology licensed from MIPS Technology, Inc., 
but the companies were using it on a variety of 
different UNIX systems. Because each user niche 
was small, there was no market movement to 
standardize software. The RJV developed a 
standardized interface to facilitate the use of 
software from multiple vendors. All needed 
standards were developed by the eight parti-
cipating members (four from the US and two from 
both the EU and Japan) in early-1999. 
The aim of the Southwest Research Institute 
Clean Heavy Duty Diesel Engine II Project was 
to develop key technologies to assist in meeting 
environmental exhaust emission standards 
applicable to diesel engines. All required techno-
logies were developed and successfully 
implemented by the eleven participating 
members in mid-1999. 
A survey instrument was developed to obtain 
information on the strategic motives for parti-
cipation in each of these RJVs. The instrument was 
pre-tested and then administered to the members 
of each RJV by the RJVs research coordinator. In 
order to ensure confidentiality, each respondent 
was asked to identify only if his company was US, 
EU-, or Japanese-based. 
The survey responses from the participants in 
the MIPS ABI Croup are summarized in Table 3. 
To generalize on the basis of the reported means: 
• the Japanese partners have the most 
experience in joint venture research and 
the US companies have the least; 
• the US companies did not seem to have an 
overriding strategic objective for participating 
in the MIPS ABI Group; 
• the EU companies did have an overriding stra-
tegic objective, namely to enhance their existing 
technological capabilities to thus enhance their 
domestic/regional competitive position; 
Table 3. MIPS ABIT Group, Inc. (mean responses are shown, n=6) 
Survey Statement 
My company participates in many research 
joint ventures (RJVs). 
My company participates in many RJVs with 
participants from various countries. 
My company participates in RJVs such as this one to enhance 
its domestic/regional competitive position. 
My company participates in RJVs such as this one 
to enhance its global competitive position. 
My company participates ¡n RJVs such as this one to enhance 
its existing technological capabilities. 
My company participates ¡n RJVs such as this one to gain 
access to new technological capabilities. 
My company's research objectives from participating 
in this RJV were met. 
US 
3.5 
3.5 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
3.5 
3.5 
EU 
4.5 
4.5 
7.0 
5.5 
5.5 
4.5 
6.5 
Japan 
6 
6.5 
5 
6 
5.5 
6.5 
4.5 
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• the Japanese companies did have an overriding 
strategic objective, namely to gain access to 
new technological capabilities to thus enhance 
their global competitive position. 
The EU companies participating in this joint 
venture reported that their research objectives 
were met more completely that those of the U.S. 
or Japanese companies. 
The survey responses from the participants in 
the Clean Heavy Duty Diesel Engine II Project are 
shown in Table 4. To generalize: 
• the EU companies have more experience in 
joint venture research than their US partners, 
especially joint venture research involving 
international participants; 
• the US companies have more domestic strategic 
goals compared to the global strategy for EU 
companies to participate in the joint venture; 
• the US companies are more uniform in their 
overriding strategic objective, namely to 
enhance their existing capabilities and to gain 
new technological capabilities. 
The US companies participating in this RJV 
reported that their research objectives were met 
more completely than those of the EU companies. 
Concluding Remarks 
The study revealed several interesting insights. 
First, European companies have got extensively 
involved in the US-based RJVs examined. The 
more frequent participants from Europe tend to 
be larger companies that also have a significant 
presence in the EU Framework Programmes. The 
technological areas in which US RJVs with 
European participation are concentrated are 
broadly similar to those supported by the EU 
Framework Programmes. These results imply 
that, for larger European firms at least, the RJVs 
supported by the EU Framework Programmes 
should be viewed as one of the available 
mechanisms to reduce technological and market 
uncertainty and to access resources. Put 
differently, EU Framework Programme RJVs 
should not be exclusively considered as policy 
instruments to fill up a gap of otherwise 
unavailable R&D (market failure argument) -
Table 4. SWRI Clean Heavy Duty Diesel Engine II Project 
(mean responses are shown, n=7) 
Survey Statement 
My company participates in many research joint ventures (RJVs). 
My company participates in many RJVs with participants 
from various countries. 
My company participates in RJVs such as this one to enhance its 
domestic/regional competitive position. 
My company participates in RJVs such as this one to enhance its 
global competitive position. 
My company participates ¡n RJVs such as this one to enhance 
its existing technological capabilities. 
My company participates in RJVs such as this one to gain 
access to new technological capabilities. 
My company's research objectives from participating 
in this RJV were met. 
US EU 
4.8 
2.5 
5.0 
4.8 
6.0 
5.3 
4.5 
6.0 
5.0 
3.0 
7.0 
4.5 
4.5 
3.0 
\ \ 3 7 
One finding was that 
European participants 
often also hare ' 
significant presence in 
the EU Framework 
Programmes, implying 
that llie RJVs supported 
by the EU Framework 
Programmes should be 
viewed as a mechanism 
for reducing 
technological and 
market uncertainty and 
for giving access to 
resources 
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although this is a clear possibility for smaller 
firms and for technologies that are still far 
removed from the market. They apparently play a 
different role for firms of different sizes and types. 
In order to continuously improve the design 
of Framework Programmes, it would be 
necessary to better understand how the 
supported collaborative R&D relates to the R&D 
companies undertake collaboratively with 
different partners and under different circums­
tances (e.g., non­subsidized collaboration) as 
well as to the R&D they undertake ¡η­house. Our 
exploratory investigation of two RJVs revealed 
important differences in members' perception of 
objectives of R&D collaboration and the success 
of RJVs in meeting these objectives. An 
indication of positive correlation between well 
defined objectives of individual partners and 
the perception of RJV success could not be 
unequivocally substantiated due to the limited 
size of the sample. Apart from more extensive 
experience of EU­based companies in R&D 
collaboration compared to US­based companies, 
no consistent pattern was indicated by the 
mean responses of the surveyed RJV members 
on the basis of national characteristics (EU 
versus US) ­ again possibly because of the 
limited size of the sample. Further investigation 
of (a) the nature of related R&D projects that 
firms undertake through different mechanisms 
and with different partners, and (b) the 
perception of management regarding the way 
such projects inter­link and affect overall 
business success, would in our opinion be a 
worthwhile endeavour. Λ 
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